I Quit Again Whistle Blower Ethical Dilemma Case Study

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INTRODUCTION [1]

1 As of 1985, Miceli & About (1985: 525) offered a definition for whistle bravado, as follows: "The disclosure by organization members (former or electric current) of illegal, immoral and illegitimate practices under the control of their employers to parties and organizations that may be able to event action".

ii As such, whistleblowers may exist internal to the visitor (an employee) or external (an ex-employee, a announcer, a non-governmental organisation or a researcher). They may brand their disclosures through internal and/or external channels, which may or may not be provided for by the management structure in identify.

3 The 14th edition of Ernst & Young's Global Fraud survey carried out in 2015 provides insights from 2,825 senior executives in 62 countries across the world. According to the survey, more than one third considered bribery and corruption to happen widely in their country, with well-nigh half able to justify unethical behaviour to run across financial targets (Ernst & Immature, 2016). These figures are a clear illustration of the tensions that be within companies between possible deviancies and their being disclosed through whistle bravado. As illustrated by Huyghe (2016), we are irrevocably in an era of revelations where secrets are to be made public.

4 As a consequence, any endeavour to reduce the development or influence of whistleblowers is useless since it is no longer possible (Miceli & Most, 1995) and sure researchers even believe it is non desirable to practise so (Liyanarachchi & Newdick, 2009). If until recently whistleblowing was a rare and individual human action, such peculiarity has become more frequent over contempo years. Indeed, it can potentially involve whatsoever employee within a company. Its impact has concluded up going well beyond the permeable framework of the company in question to reach civil society. In revealing organisational deviances (Cappelletti, 2010), whistleblowers henceforth personify the look-out post that denounces the irregular words and practices of companies (Bournois & Bourion, 2008).

5 Other than a small number of investigative journalists (Denis Robert in the Clearstream thing) or whistleblowers themselves (Stéphanie Gibaud in the UBS case, or Irène Frachon in the Médiator thing), very few French researchers in the field of the management sciences have shown whatsoever interest in whistleblowing and the style it is dealt with, fifty-fifty though it is a very popular expanse of inquiry in the English-speaking world [2] . In the wake of the pioneering work undertaken in 1999 by Chateauraynaud & Torny (2013), a small number of research articles written in French take examined the genesis and figure of whistleblowers (de Bry, 2008; Bournois & Bourion, 2008; Charreire Petit & Surply, 2012), their career paths and level of resilience (Charreire Petit & Cusin, 2013). Some of the piece of work has concentrated on the touch of warning systems put in place in companies post-obit the Sarbanes-Oxley Law (Charreire Petit & Surply, 2008; Mauduit, 2008), whilst other researchers have dug deeper through the analysis of a certain number of high-contour media figures (Frachon, 2015; Musiani, 2015).

vi Yet, it would appear that none of this work has seriously researched the question of whistleblowing from a management perspective. In outcome, little consideration has been given to the legal framework (whistleblowing systems and processes) and the eventual treatment of whistleblowers, fifty-fifty though the tensions created by whistleblowing is a rich subject and opens upward new possibilities for hereafter research. Every bit such, the question of whistleblowers is a dual paradox for companies.

7 On the one hand, in that location is a moral paradox. The law surrounding whistleblowing (in countries where such legislation exists) requires companies to set up systems and to protect whistleblowers using these if they belong to the organisation and/or to answer accusations if the whistleblower is external to the organisation (and non only by taking libel action). In doing so, the Law requires companies concerned by whistleblowing to protect those that may destabilize or weaken them. This ways that companies are required to protect the individuals that attack them, i.eastward. to provide confidential data, for case, to those that finish past denouncing the organisation and who may actually be their own employees.

8 On the other mitt, there is a managerial paradox. Senior managers are required to be totally defended (Igalens, 2004), just at the same fourth dimension to be the guardians of the upstanding values of their employers (Peretti, 2010). In improver, nosotros are now working in liberated companies (Carney & Getz, 2009), which value the freedom of responsible, enervating and innovative individuals. Finally, the increase in the number of Ethics Charters (Pereira, 2009) and the pressure put on major companies' CSR policies simply goes to reinforce the phenomenon and in plow ends up being applicable to all other parts of the organization. The astonishment of professionals faced with the increasing importance of whistleblowers is surprising, since it is simply a straight issue of the requirement to increasingly integrate ethical values (repeated each time there is a new economic crunch) in higher education programmes right through to the twenty-four hours to day work of employees.

9 The objective of this paper is therefore to illustrate how whistleblowers are a moral and managerial paradox for their companies. We analyze this dual paradox, in the lite of recent legal developments which, to a sure extent, reinforce this state of diplomacy despite their being. The commodity aims to ameliorate understand the reasons behind the cryptic discourse of companies on whistleblowers (Larue, 2007), since this discourse is upheld past the very measures designed to collect and deal with warnings, which in the cease… are implemented in the hope they do not serve their purpose!

THE MORAL PARADOX THAT THE Constabulary CANNOT SOLVE

10 The piece of work of Miceli & Near has clearly shown that the essential divergence between a whistleblower and an "inactive observer" (1985) is the interest of the individual for the activity of the organisation, rather than for the organisational framework enabling alter and internal communications (being of communication channels for whistleblowing, supervision by managers, etc.). It would appear that private characteristics (Miceli & Well-nigh, 1985; 1988) prevail over the transition from employee to the "condition" of whistleblower. You are non built-in a whistleblower, simply yous get 1 (Charreire Petit & Cusin, 2013; Cailleba, 2016a) through a "'subjectively rational' decision process", which refers back to the decision-taking schema already described by March et al. (1958). De facto, the individually-fabricated moral choice solves the paradox of the outcome of loyalty: should one be loyal to one's employer or rather to i's own values (and very often those of Society)? This question is also raised by Charreire Petit & Surply (2011) in their assay of the fundamental decision of a potential whistleblower to speak out or to remain silent in terms of loyalty to the organisation and hierarchical obedience. Recent evolutions in French legislation every bit regards the protection of whistleblowers [3] (cf. The Sapin Law II, 2016) invite united states of america to revisit these questions. So doing, nosotros see that in spite of real improvements in their protection, whistleblowers and also companies yet find themselves faced with pressures that are hard to overcome. The ambiguity of the situation is illustrated by the moral paradox of whistleblowing for whistleblowers and company directors referring dorsum to a similar opposition between individual moral values and loyalty to one'south visitor and one'due south job. From an etymological perspective [4], the moral paradox is besides ambiguous for companies because it makes its mark on both whistleblowers and managers, whilst at the same time creating defoliation given that each side comes upward with a unlike or at least opposite solution.

THE MORAL PARADOX FOR WHISTLEBLOWERS

eleven Following the Enron scandal in December 2001, the American authorities decided to legislate through the Sarbanes-Oxley Police (SOX, 2002) requiring internal notification: from that betoken on, whistleblowers were required in the starting time instance to inform their line manager within the company. This police had to be applied by all Wall Street listed companies (Nasdaq or AMEX) with an almanac turnover of more than $75 one thousand thousand. It was extended to companies based in or operating out of France. De facto, the actress-territorial nature of this American law raised and still raises numerous questions (Assemblée Nationale, 2016a). The original legislative framework included an ethical early reporting system, the creation and overhaul of internal Ethics Committees, Audit Committees, Remuneration Committees, Nominating Committees, etc, every bit well as new rules concerning conflicts of interest. Although applying this law proved difficult in France for both legal and cultural reasons (de Bry, 2008; Charreire Petit & Surply, 2008a & b), an initial ethical early on reporting system was put in place, fifty-fifty if this was done in a "very hetereogeneous and disparate" fashion (Mauduit, 2008: 133).

12 Several years later in 2014, the Commission of Ministers of the European Quango adopted a recommendation to protect whistleblowers, defined as: "whatsoever person who reports or discloses information on a threat or harm to the public involvement in the context of their work-based relationship, whether it be in the public or private sector" (European Council, 2014). Equally a upshot, the European definition became less precise (it no longer merely concerned wrongdoings classed equally being illegal, immoral or illegitimate) but more universal (whatsoever disclosure apropos a threat or damage to the public interest).

xiii Upwardly until 2015, whistleblowers were non "obliged to disclose information internally" (Bourdon, 2015). In October 2016, the Sapin II Police for transparency, the fight against corruption and the modernisation of the economic system proposed a general framework in line with the recommendations of the European Council. By simplifying them, it brought together all the sector-based laws and regulations produced by the French legal system since 2007 [five]. Indeed, the Sapin 2 Law gave Parliament a new definition of a whistleblower. According to Article half dozen adopted by the French Parliament (Assemblée Nationale, 2016b), officially a whistleblower is: "any person who reveals or reports, acting selflessly and in good organized religion:

14

A criminal offense or an offence,
• A serious and clear violation of:
an international commitment which has been ratified or approved by France,
a unilateral act of an international system adopted on the basis of such delivery, or a serious alienation of a law or regulation,
• Or a serious threat or impairment to the public interest of which the individual has had personal knowledge."

15 The formal disclosure of a criminal thing was confirmed, and at the same time then was the breach of a commitment to the French State by itself or by an international organisation. The mode the Law is written means a whistleblower can be internal or external to an organisation. This was considered to be major progress given that until so whistleblowers had been linked to their employers by a past or present work-based relationship. The Police also included what can be considered to be the current take chances ( "harm") and time to come adventure ( "threat") to public interest. This provides for a broad scope going from financial issues to health and safe and the environs (Meyer, 2016).

16 However, the Sapin Two Police force did not go as far equally to requite the status of whistleblower to legal entities, which in turn raised a number of difficulties [6]. Likewise, some researchers have underlined the limited nature – even if it appears to exist more precise – of the French definition in relation to the European i, which widens the scope of disclosure "to any disclosure fabricated in the public involvement" (Foegle, 2016). Furthermore, it has been mentioned that to limit disclosure to "good organized religion" or to a selfless human activity is besides vague (Foegle, 2016), which may in plough discredit the whistleblower and stifle the initiative taken by them: "are we still shooting the messenger?" (Ashton, 2015).

17 Three lines can be fatigued to the object of a disclosure, since null tin can be reported concerning classified military information, doc-patient confidentiality or the confidential nature of the human relationship between lawyers and their clients. Even if the arguments in favour of protecting classified military information are unremarkably known, without e'er being justified, (Grasset, 2001), the framework for medical secrets when applied to the work of laboratories in the pharmacological industry leaves room to be sceptical. Indeed, the potential seriousness of excesses caused past ignoring wellness risks cannot be under-estimated (Brisard & Beguin, 2016).

18 Over and above whatever new definition of a whistleblower, and before this has even been put into practise, information technology would appear necessary to bring special attention to the moral paradox the current laws practice not solve, even if the powers-that-be recognising a more protective condition is a welcome step in the right direction.

19 Although considered by some to exist the man, or rather the adult female  [vii]who knew "really also much" (Gibaud, 2014), or just the enemy from within, whistleblowers are individuals whose loyalty and values button them to act non only in the interest of their visitor, but also in the involvement of Society (Cailleba, 2016). The clash of diverging interests exposes obvious tensions between the economical interests of companies and the commonage interests of Club. Consequently, the whistleblower's value system is put to the exam by the employer and by Society in general, which are two carve up however as legitimate sources. One time informed of a potential offence, the State is required to take activity on the disclosure. When organisational ethics are not enough to settle issues internally, the Courts are called in through the questioning of the collective censor. This so raises a moral paradox that is heightened by the confrontation of the company'south employees with the managers in charge of applying the law.

xx Equally far equally France was concerned in 2008, ethical whistleblowing systems did exist, merely were "random and merely relatively recently introduced" (de Bry, 2008: 144). One of the reasons for being and so far behind other countries is certainly due to French culture (de Bry, 2008; Charreire Petit & Surply, 2012) and the tormented history of the Second Earth War, during which "the French Resistance saw the reporting of events as treason and silence as an act of heroism" (Bournois & Bourion, 2008: 34). Even today in France, people are reluctant to blow the whistle on a work colleague (Larue, 2007). These cultural reticences are fifty-fifty noticeable in the negative connotations carried by the way the term whistleblower is translated into certain other European languages (Transparency International, 2013: xix-21). Indeed, "denunciation" is put forward as a term without specifying "divulgation", "révelation" or "signalement" as in the new law. This can be confirmed by considering the case of Quebec, which was not occupied by the German army. In Quebec the terms "dénonciateur" and "lanceur d'alerte" are freely employed [eight].

21 Earlier disclosing or reporting an irregular or illegal deed, a person naturally asks questions near the very nature of something that incriminates another person or entity. Cultural dimensions arise beyond the actual object of the disclosure and the influence of Gild or History may exist an obstacle to it. The individual is faced with a moral dilemma, hesitating between breaking the organisational silence in the name of truth on the one mitt, and on the other hand remaining true to an employer and colleagues in the proper noun of loyalty (Cailleba, 2016a & b). The dilemma of an employee-whistleblower can be represented as follows in figure ane.

Effigy 1

The Whistleblower's Dilemma (Adapted from Charreire, Petit & Surply, 2012)

THE EMPLOYEE	Speak Up	Stay Silent
Obedience	Obeying the Ideals Charter / the Code of Practiced Practise, etc.	Obedience equally misconduct
Loyalty	Towards the organisation	Towards one'south managers

The Whistleblower's Dilemma (Adjusted from Charreire, Petit & Surply, 2012)

22 According to French Labour Law, an employee may be dismissed for three types of reason [9]:

23

• Misconduct or negligence ( "faute"): the mistake committed by the employee does not necessarily justify the classification of serious misconduct. All the same, it can be a existent and serious cause for dismissal. An employee can be defendant of simple misconduct, for example, in the upshot of an error or negligence committed by them in the course of their work;
• Gross misconduct or negligence ( "faute grave"): the error is considered equally gross misconduct when it makes information technology impossible to keep the employee in the company. The error (south) must be directly owing to the employee;
• Willful misconduct or negligence ( "faute lourde"): the error is considered as willful misconduct when it is committed with the intention of harming the employer. Information technology is upward to the employer to evidence whatsoever intention to damage. Failing that, the employee may be accused of willful misconduct.

24 If to obey is to "modify ane's behaviour so as to comply with the orders of legitimate say-so" (Allard-Poesi, 2006), 'obedience as misconduct' ( "faute d'obéissance") therefore means taking a determination and/ or adopting behaviour to divest oneself of whatsoever responsibility concerning its consequences. The employee then stays silent, whereas they should take spoken up and informed their line managing director. They tin can end up being blamed for the intention to harm the employer (willful misconduct) besides as the desire to protect colleagues (gross misconduct), for case. Obedience as misconduct involves professional misconduct just every bit much as it involves moral failings. Whistleblowers overcome this past emphasizing the moral aspect whilst at the same fourth dimension hoping to eventually invoke their professional integrity. Fifty-fifty if the number of whistleblowing cases has increased over the terminal few years in France, this individual and moral dilemma all the same remains present.

THE MORAL PARADOX FOR THE Company AND ITS DIRECTORS

25 A second moral paradox tin can be added to the first classical one already discussed above. Information technology covers what visitor directors go through; in other words, why should an employee exist protected (in the instance of an internal whistleblower), when the disclosure harms the future of the organisation or at to the lowest degree damages its reputation?

26 In this way, beyond the individual moral paradox in that location is an organisational ane too. Through its managers, the company is confronted with a paradoxical situation from a moral point of view. The company finds itself at odds, on the i hand, with the legitimate protection of its economic interests (Friedman, 1970). And on the other hand, information technology is non only at odds with reinforced legal requirements to protect the whistleblower, but besides at odds with a new requirement to ensure the disclosure is made public (at least internally) and appropriately dealt with.

27 Firstly, article 7 of the Sapin II Law renders the whistleblower criminally liable "every bit long every bit the disclosure is necessary and proportional to the protection of the interests in question" (Assemblée Nationale, 2016b) and as long as the previously mentioned legal guidelines are followed (cf. above). Even if the Constabulary leaves open the question of civil liability and the fact that a whistleblower can exist prosecuted for libel (article xiii), organisations are now fully aware of the limits to the legal action they tin have against a whistleblower.

28 Next, co-ordinate to article 8, companies are required to implement procedures and brand other arrangements which provide channels for the disclosure: in other words, "appropriate disclosure procedures (…) are to be set by public or individual entities with more than 50 employees" (Assemblée Nationale, 2016b). These procedures are legal requirements for any public or private organisation, and for whatever national, regional or local authority.

29 As a result, information technology is stipulated that disclosures can exist "made by their members of staff or by external or casual collaborators" (Assemblée Nationale, 2016b). Once a line manager has been informed, the organisation is required to verify the acceptability of the disclosure "within a reasonable period of time" that is to be divers. Failure to do and then may pb to "a legal, administrative or other professional trunk" [x] being direct informed of the disclosure. Finally, in the case of the disclosure not being dealt with by 1 of these organisations "within a period of iii months the disclosure tin exist made public".

thirty In any case, according to article viii once again, the disclosure may exist made public or brought to the attention of the organisations mentioned above "in the case of a serious or imminent danger or in the presence of a chance that would cause irreversible harm" (Assemblée Nationale, 2016b). Companies should therefore deal quickly and efficiently with a disclosure in order prevent the situation beingness made aware of besides presently beyond its ain confines. In addition, preventing a disclosure can be punished by a jail sentence and past a fine (article xiii). The Ombudsman can provide a whistleblower who requests their assistance with support, including financial help (article 8 & 14). Every bit we have already seen, a company may be defendant of obstructing a disclosure and run across the whistleblower assigned the help of the Ombudsman.

31 Throughout the procedure, the confidentiality of the identity of the whistleblower is guaranteed, declining which a prison house sentence and a €30,000 fine can be applied (Assemblée Nationale, 2016b). Fifty-fifty the legal potency is only allowed to reveal the identity of the whistleblower with their permission, and only "once the disclosure has been fully justified" (article 9). The company is therefore required to keep the identity of the whistleblower surreptitious. Even so the whistleblower is the person through whom a scandal starts and who, by definition, may jeopardise the reputation and even the future of the company. Even then, the Law does not explicate how the identity should be kept cloak-and-dagger: should the disclosure be paper-based to avoid any electronic trace left by a professional person email? Or on the contrary, shouldn't the use of an bearding electronic mail help with keeping identities secret? In which case, it is pointless to ship the e-mail to one's straight line manager! Similarly, the Law does not brand it articulate almost who should guarantee keeping the identity of a whistleblower secret. Being responsible for keeping an identity secret is a hard task for an individual, as it is for a section. Information technology therefore becomes necessary to train managers, executive managers and in item the members of the Human Resources department to do this.

32 A legal framework for deportment that put to the test private morals and ethics within a company (Cuevas & Cailleba, 2015) is destined to produce a paradoxical situation for those who are supposed to enforce information technology or who are quite simply directly concerned past it. This police force is unique in that it also creates a moral paradox for the company. As such, information technology puts pressure on senior managers for whom it is as moral to defend and promote the economic interests of their visitor as it is to defend their employees whose disclosures or revelations gamble damaging these very same interests. This puts a strain on the visitor and its senior managers because the law may open up the door to potential risks for the organization. The traditional moral paradox of the employee, who may hesitate between loyalty and obedience (run across Table 1) is consequently exasparated by the moral paradox of senior managers, who take a dual legal obligation to:

33

• Reinforce the protection of employees (if they are internal) accusing them of a misdemeanour, a crime, or a violation of the law that is likely to cause serious prejudice to the full general interest;
• Prepare channels for disclosures and for dealing with them, which in turn might undermine conviction in Management and in the company itself.

34 The trouble raised for companies by the management of whistleblowers (and not just the management of the disclosure) is a managerial i when each member of staff is asked to both promote and defend the values of their visitor (Kraakman, 1986; Bournois & Bourion, 2008). As a issue, it has become necessary to understand this central managerial paradox personified by whistleblowers, in order to explore avenues to overcome information technology in the involvement of a range of stakeholders (whistleblowers, companies, Society). What is the bespeak of protecting an individual who damages the reputation and fifty-fifty the future of a company? Wouldn't a police that provides too much protection, indirectly aim to weaken companies by guaranteeing certain rights to the "enemy from within"?

THE MANAGERIAL PARADOX FORCED ON THE COMPANY By WHISTLEBLOWERS

35 It is no coincidence that whistleblowers have become a inquiry topic. Employee initiatives (Peters & Waterman, 1983), the delegation of responsibility throughout the system via managerial practices such as empowerment (Spreitzer, 2007) and the promotion of the liberated visitor (Carney & Getz, 2009) have ended upwards by being established as mainstream discourse in companies. New means of communication and the desire for transparency have accelerated the miracle via information exchange and interaction between all the members of the system (Barlatier, 2016). In addition, the increased complexity of organisations in the areas of financial controlling (Mériade & Mainetti, 2013), adventure management (Guillon, 2011) and management (Mattei, 2012), whether they exist public or private, has brought about the demand for greater autonomy and the call for both managers and their staff to deed more responsibly.

36 In such a context, to regret the rising influence of whistleblowers would exist a truthful managerial paradox. On what grounds is information technology correct to criticise employees who exercise their liberty of speech about their profession in light of their upstanding values, whereas they were recruited because they could incarnate these, among other values, in their work? As a consequence, it can be noted that there is a disharmonize between the logic of compliance specific to each company and the need for each organization to protect itself by containing within its walls the manifestation of ills by whistleblowers.

THE LOGIC OF COMPLIANCE AND OPEN Support FOR WHISTLEBLOWERS

37 The French organization Le Cercle de la Compliance defines compliance every bit follows: "all processes that contribute to ensuring that employees and managers apply the rules of the company, simply also the values and the upstanding spirit generated by the senior management team". Compliance is non a simple matter of grade, but "is to exist structured (…) around an organisational arrangement set-up throughout the visitor or the organisation" [11]. By creating an ethical civilisation supported by an arrangement-wide policy, compliance underpins any initiative that works to limit (or internally denounce through specific channels) occurrences of malpractice inside the organisation (Liyanarachchi & Newdick, 2009). Putting into identify an Upstanding Lawmaking of Conduct contributes to this arroyo, as well as setting up internal committees, hotlines or other arrangements designed specifically for whistleblowing, amidst other things. In fact, virtually companies initially draw upwardly and issue ethics charters and codes of conduct to ensure compliance aligned with what is sometimes an extra-territorial legal framework (cf. higher up, the Sarbannes-Oxley Police). As a general rule, it is non the extra-territorial nature of compliance that is advanced in direction discourse, only more the matching of compliance actions with the CSR standards adhered to by the visitor or that it claims in a CSR strategy. But, what virtually actually putting words into practice? Does staking a claim to compliance actually mean in that location are no tensions between CSR declarations and practice that cannot be observed?

38 Upwardly until the introduction of the Sapin Two Law, it was "much more preferable to make disclosures to third parties (journalists, elected representatives, merchandise unions, prosecutors)" (Bourdon, 2015) because in practice, cases were virtually systematically stifled from within. Equally of now, the law recommends get-go of all an internal publication of the disclosure, with the possibility of outside publication if required (in the instance of a long process or the serious nature of the prejudice). Be that as it may, it is in the total involvement of companies to accept measures to forestall the effects of "a hereafter time-bomb" (Charreire Petit & Surply, 2008: 122). It is does not mean that disclosures should be avoided, merely rather any wrongdoings that may give rise to a disclosure should be. At the same time, whatever potential disclosures should as well exist channelled finer.

39 Thus, the managerial paradox is based upon a contradictory injunction that requires managers to be both:

forty

• A senior member of staff with impeccable ethical behaviour working in an autonomous but constantly changing professional framework, and;
• A fellow member of staff whose performance (ipso facto their career) is assessed according to mainly quantitative objectives (oft financial), which must be improved each year.

41 It is for this reason that compliance is translated by a set of procedures aimed at supporting and protecting potential whistleblowers through principles (applying the law) and likewise through values (promoting ethical values). By calling on "gatekeepers" (Bournois & Bourion, 2008; Vandekerckhove & Tsahuridu, 2010), i.e. employees whose job it is to "guarantee that relevant regulations are followed" but also by promoting ethical values or codes of conduct within the company, the organization controls and limits irregular professional practice that may otherwise pb to disclosures.

PROTECTING THE COMPANY OR THE IMPORTANCE OF Circumscribed DISCLOSURES

42 Whatever the sector of activity of a company, wanting to keep a bank check on and limiting disclosures, or even threateninig potential whistleblowers with retaliatory measures is counter-productive for the work atmosphere (Parmerlee & al., 1982; Miceli & Near, 1994b) and for troubleshooting (Miceli & Virtually, 1989; Near & Miceli, 1996; Charreire Petit & Cusin, 2013). In situations where the disclosure has been stifled from within the company, whistleblowers may be tempted to speak out urbi and orbi. The new French Sapin II Law supports this type of initiative. However, making an open up disclosure runs the risk of existence fifty-fifty more violent and damaging for the company, if not for its turnover in any case for its reputation (Rayner, 2004).

43 Every bit far as companies are concerned, it would appear necessary to retain disclosures within its own walls for two reasons. Firstly, disclosures should be internally controlled and confined efficiently to prevent them getting out. Secondly, in the respect of compliance, disclosures inside the visitor should be sincerely and ethically brought to the attending of the person (due south) authorized to deal with them and confirm their serious nature. Since organisational entropy (Cappelletti, 2010) explains that deviance is inherent to homo activeness, and a fortiori to any human collectivity, setting up systems to channel disclosures is vital for companies.

44 Confining the disclosure also involves the legal obligation to protect whistleblowers confronting whatsoever reprisals. Identified every bit the traitor who breaches the moral contract with their employer (Nigh& al., 2004; Cailleba, 2016 a), whistleblowers are put under all sorts of straight and indirect pressure, which are part and package of their state (Charreire Petit & Cusin, 2013) and which are apparently linked to a mail-traumatic stress syndrome for them (Bourdon, 2015).

Determination

45 This article has identified a dual (moral and managerial) paradox for the direction of whistleblowers. This dual paradox is fractal in its moral dimension. In this dimension, there is firstly a classical private moral paradox to which the new French Sapin II Law then adds a moral organisational paradox. The ambivalence of the moral paradox highlighted here reaches its highest due to the pressures placed on whistleblowers and senior managers. On the one side there is the defence force of moral private values, and on the other the defence of the company. These pressures are equally powerful and terminate upwardly by creating a permanent divide between the unlike parties.

46 Firstly, everyone who hesitates to written report something, equally defined by the Sapin Two Law, finds themself at odds with the principle of loyalty to their employer on the one hand, and with being truthful to their own upstanding principles, on the other. This is the first private moral paradox. In parallel, the company is required to gear up suitable systems to deal with this kind of disclosure, whilst at the same time keeping confidential the identity of the whistleblower whose very actions might bring down the reputation and even the economical welfare of the visitor. This is the 2d moral paradox, which is organisational. Finally, the managerial paradox is characterised by the fact that companies crave their employees, and in item their senior managers, to be more autonomous, to take more responsibilities and to defend its values. At the same time, companies are increasingly wary of their employees' freedom of speech and of their potentially negative bear upon in case they detect a misalignment of the strategic soapbox with the everyday behaviour of their colleagues.

47 Up until recently, very few studies had dealt with the dual paradox of the nature of whistleblowing. The main limitation to our work could lead ane to believe that whistleblowers are only only an upstanding effigy amidst others. However, becoming a whistleblower ways acquiring - oft inspite of oneself - a status that does not really offer any protection and which it subsequently becomes difficult to get rid of in the eyes of a present or future employer, or in the eyes of Social club. In the same way equally business organisation leaders, whistleblowers represent a dynamic socio-economic structure as well every bit a political and cultural ane. This construction is fabricated necessary past companies themselves and their stakeholders.

48 If Society is to promote autonomous ideals and individual delivery, it is crucial to stand up for whistleblowers, who are the very incarnation of this (Hauserman, 1986). Whistleblowing does non give protection status in companies. Whistleblowing has truly become part and parcel of the job description of each and every employee.

49 Finally, our work rings true with that done in the field of Critical Direction Studies (CMS), which has put forward an anti-performative dimension of a certain organisational culture (Fournier & Greyness, 2000). The paradoxical nature of whistleblowing we have illustrated is a reflection of the constraints generated by certain managerial practices in organisations (Alvesson, 2008; Spicer et al., 2009). In fact, past setting upward management systems (either early alarm or whistleblowing), whilst at the same time concentrating their efforts on making sure they are not used, aren't companies searching for anti-performativity apropos the question of whistleblowing? To exist considered…

APPENDIX 1: HISTORY OF WESTERN WHISTLEBLOWING SYSTEMS

l At the international level, the first whistleblowing acts appeared just before the end of the 20th Century (de Bry, 2008), and mainly in Anglo-Saxon countries:

51 • 1998: Great britain (Public Interest Disclosure Act or Pida);

52 • 1999: South Africa (Protected Disclosures Deed), Commonwealth of australia (Federal Public Service Act); Northern Ireland (Public Interest Disclosure

53 Ordre); European Matrimony (Statut des fonctionnaires des

54 Communautés Européennes, modified in 2004);

55 • 2000: New Zealand (Protected Disclosures Act);

56 • 2001: South Korea (Anti-Abuse Act);

57 • 2004: Canada (Public Servants Disclosure Protection Legislation); Netherlands (Corporate Governance Code of Conduct); etc.

58 However, less than ten years after the SOX police force, the 2008 subprime crisis in the United States of America has exposed a certain number of its limits. Patently, internal ethical disclosures would appear to no longer be enough (Vaughn, 2014). Modifications to the 1863Ceremonious False Claims Act were fabricated in 2008 and voted through in 2009 in order to toughen up the sanctions against companies found guilty of fraud (SEC, 2011). In particular, the qui tam procedure was clarified under the two mandates of President Obama (2009-2012 & 2013-2016), by giving more prerogatives and protection to whistleblowers who speak up externally. Under the framework of the Dodd-Frank Act (2010), whistleblowers can take reward of a "bounty" or reward system, which can go as far as to giving them a function of the coin recuperated (via revenue enhancement adjustments) or the fines paid to the Country via this process [eleven] (Rashty, 2015). Through their studies on the affect of this law on professional practice, as well equally the application of dissimilar regulatory systems, certain researchers have mentioned the benefits of increased efficiency (Feldman & Lobel, 2010; Pope & Lee, 2013), and fifty-fifty the heightened "moral autonomy" (Mogielnicki, 2011; p.74) of visitor employees. Other researchers have been less categoric by giving a reminder of the risk that this has on the morale of those involved (Vandekerckhove & Tsahuridu, 2008; 2010), as well as on the trend for disempowerment (Cailleba, 2016a).

59 In France, the legal texts regulating the status of whistleblowers take, up until now, been considered to be "likewise thin" (Masounave, 2015):

60 • Constabulary of 13th November 2007: individual sector employees may disembalm cases of corruption;

61 • Law of 29th December 2011 for the reinforcement of the health safety of health products;

62 • Police force of 16th Apr 2013 on "the contained nature of the appraisal of health and ecology issues and of whistleblowers";

63 • Law of 11th Oct 2013 (n° 2013-907) on transparency in public matters;

64 • Law of 6th December 2013-1117 on tax evasion and serious economical and financial crime. In particular; article xl of the penal code of procedure requires ceremonious servants to written report any criminal offences;

65 • Article 50. 1161-ane of the Labour Police force: employees who in expert faith make disclosures almost abuse are protected confronting any reprisals.

Notes

• [1]

  We would like to give thanks Stephen R. Platt for his kind help in copy-editing the English version of this newspaper.

• [2]

  Since 1981, in the Periodical of Business organisation Ethics alone, there have been a considerable number of papers, as follows: 273 for whistleblowing and 405 for whistle-blowing, which is the equivalent of betwixt 7 and 11 papers per year referring to the subject field or entirely defended to it (EBSCO, September 2016). Meet also the non-exhaustive list of papers and books written past the Amercian specialists Miceli & Near in the bibliography.

• [3]

  Cf. Appendix 1 for an international comparison.

• [four]

  Ambiguus, from ambigere, to doubt, from amb, effectually (vowel. AMBE), and igere, for agere, to push (vowel. AGIR); word for discussion, which pushes from both sides. Littré dictionnary (https://www.littre.org/).

• [5]

  Until recently, the French legal arsenal was considered to be « incomplete » (Transparency international, 2013). Cf Appendix 1 for French texts apropos the status of whistleblowers.

• [half dozen]

  The films fabricated in 2016 by the L214 association showing the degrading handling of animals and the non-compliance with certain rules and regulations in certain French slaughterhouses, or fifty-fifty the actions undertaken past the FUDA (Forcefulness Unies cascade le Droit des Animaux) or PETA France associations, points to current and future difficulties in the recognition of legal entities as whistleblowers.

• [7]

  Reading mainstream and specialist western media reveals that there are but as many, if not more, female whistleblowers as in that location are men. Examples include: Erin Brockovitch (PG & E), Irène Frachon (Médiator), Stéphanie Gibaud (UBS), Nicole Marie Meyer (Ministère français des Affaires Etrangères), Sherron Watkins (Enron), Cynthia Cooper (WorldCom) and Coleen Rowley (FBI).

• [8]
• [ix]
• [ten]

  It should exist noted that Trade Unions are not included in this law. This does not forestall them being informed, but information technology does non give them any official power or failing that whatsoever influence.

• [eleven]

  The Cercle de la Compliance is an association of French lawyers, company lawyers and ethics professionals. Its mission is to promote, publish, advise, train and raise awareness of those working in business, politics, the press and compliance:

  http://www.cercledelacompliance.com/

  .

• [11]

  Anglo-Saxon legal procedure dating from the Middle Ages for which the full title in 14^th Century Latin is "qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur", translated every bit "[i] who sues in this matter for the Rex [as well as] for oneself". In France, since 1^st January 2017 and for a trial period of 2 years, the amendment to the Finance Beak adopted by the National Assembly on seven^th November 2016 officially allows international tax fraud informants to be remunerated. The texts exercise not explicitly mention whistleblowers or informants, only "whatsoever person who does not piece of work for a public authority". Spider web site consulted 9 December 2016 at:

  http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/fourteen/amendements/4061C/CION_TOUTE/CF275.pdf

  .

The purpose of this essay is to place those paradoxes personified by the whistleblower. An analysis of the recent evolution of the French and international legislative framework concerning whistleblowers helps united states understand what a moral paradox actually is. The full general discourse effectually corporate ethics, the encouragement of initiative-taking and the increasing responsibility of employees, explains, in turn, a managerial paradox. The article explains how the whistleblower embodies both a moral and managerial paradox for the company. We analyze this dual paradox, in the light of contempo legal developments which, to a sure extent, reinforce this state of affairs despite their existence. The commodity aims to meliorate understand the reasons behind the cryptic discourse of companies on whistleblowers, since this discourse is upheld by the very measures designed to collect and deal with warnings, which in the end... are implemented in the promise that they practice non serve their purpose!

Keywords

• whistleblower
• paradox
• ethics
• direction
• morals

1. INTRODUCTION
2. THE MORAL PARADOX THAT THE Police force CANNOT SOLVE
3. 1. THE MORAL PARADOX FOR WHISTLEBLOWERS
   2. THE MORAL PARADOX FOR THE COMPANY AND ITS DIRECTORS
4. THE MANAGERIAL PARADOX FORCED ON THE COMPANY BY WHISTLEBLOWERS
5. 1. THE LOGIC OF COMPLIANCE AND OPEN SUPPORT FOR WHISTLEBLOWERS
   2. PROTECTING THE COMPANY OR THE IMPORTANCE OF Circumscribed DISCLOSURES
6. CONCLUSION

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Patrice Cailleba

Groupe ESC Pau
Professor of Management at ESC Pau Business organisation School (France) and a member of IRMAPE Laboratory. His enquiry field covers business ethics, organisational behavior and politics. Patrice obtained his doctoral caste in Philosophy from the Sorbonne University (Paris 4) and graduated from ESCP Europe (MiM). He is auditor of the IHEDN (Institute for Higher National Defence Studies).

patrice.cailleba@esc-pau.fr

Sandra Charreire Petit

RITM, Université Paris Sud
Professor in Management at Paris Sud University / Paris-Saclay and a member of the RITM laboratory. Her researches focuse on learning and managing change in organizations. In this context, she is interested in particular management systems such as whistleblowing and in the whistleblower'southward trajectory.

sandra.charreire-petit@u-psud.fr

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